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1. Introduction 
When considering the agents mediated electronic marketplace, agents play an active role in 
both sellers and buyers sides. A seller agent may advertise its products in the market, 
placing the selling price and looking for the potential buyers in the market. On the other 
hand, a buyer agent would look for the desired goods or services requested by its user and it 
has a task to bargain about the price of the products and find the best deal (Dignum, 2001). 
Besides that, due to the rapid growth of Information Technology and popularities of the 
Internet, more trading that could be done in bricks and mortar is now available without 
geographical constraint by using the computer and the Internet. Therefore, sellers are now 
looking for a larger group of potential buyers while buyers are looking for a better offer of 
their desired goods in the online marketplace. 
1.1 Online auctions 
An auction is a bidding mechanism, described by a set of auction rules that specifies how 
the winner is determined and how much to be paid (Wolfstetter, 1999). By auctioning, 
sellers find a way to determine the actual values of the items being auctioned especially 
those items which are hard in valuation process. By auctioning also, items are allocated to 
the bidders who have the highest valuation. Therefore, auction mechanism is an interesting 
topic to be studied since it provides an approach to the price formation of the item. Besides, 
McAfee and McMillan (1987) argued that studying auction is closer to applications than 
other mathematical economics. The auction theory explains the existence of certain trading 
institutions and may suggest improvements in these institutions. 
In the virtual marketplace which sells a single object, there are basically four types of online 
auction protocols, namely the ascending-price (English) auction, the descending-price 
(Dutch) auction, the first-price sealed bid auction and the second-price sealed bid (Vickrey) 
auction. In the ascending-price (English) auction, sellers start at a low price and the price is 
successively raised by bidders until the auction end time is reached. The bidder with the 
highest bid wins the auction and pays based on the bid submitted. 
The descending-price (Dutch) auction is the opposite of an English auction. An auctioneer 
starts announcing an auction with an initial high price. This high price is normally higher 
than the item’s actual price. The initial bid will be lowered progressively until there is an 
offer from a bidder to claim the item. The winner pays the price offered. 
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The first-price sealed bid auction and the second-price sealed bid auction are quite similar in 
terms of the bid submission. Interested bidders submit their bids privately and these bids 
are concealed until the auction ends. When the auction ends, those concealed bids are 
disclosed. Bidder with the highest bid will be identified as the winner. However, in the 
former auction type, the winner pays for the item with his bid, but the second highest bid in 
the latter type of auction is paid. 
Regardless of which auction protocols are used in the online auctions, there are many online 
auction sites that are available on the Internet. Moreover, as this mechanism is accepted by 
more people, the number of auctions conducted in this virtual marketplace is increasing 
drastically. Thus, a bidder would find it very hard to find a suitable auction to participate. 
This problem leads to a question, is there any alternative method to overcome this dilemma? 
The answer can be found by using agent technology. 
1.2 Agent technology 
According to Jennings and Wooldridge (1998), an intelligent agent is a computer entity that 
is capable of flexible autonomous action in order to meet its design objectives. The term 
flexible here means that an intelligent agent should be responsive, proactive and social. 
These intelligent agents should solve their problems encountered in their environment 
without direct intervention of human or other agents. Furthermore, as intelligent agents, 
they have their own goals to be achieved (Dignum, 2001). So, when the outside world is 
changed, they should not simply react to these changes; they should also exhibit 
opportunistic, goal-directed behaviors and take initiatives where appropriate to achieve 
their primary objective. On the other hand, they should perceive their environment and 
respond consistently to changes that occur. This property somehow neutralizes the pro-
activeness of agents. It prevents agents from trying to achieve their goals without 
considering the achievability of the goals. They must also interact with one another (other 
agents or human) in order to complete their goals and help others with their problems. 
To this end, an agent system may seem to be similar to an object-oriented system. For 
example, an object in the object–oriented system encapsulates some states and has control 
over these states. These states can only be accessed or modified via the methods provided by 
the object. So does the agent. But the behaviors of an agent are also encapsulated. For 
example, if there is an object X that invokes a method m on object Y, then Y has no control 
over whether m is executed or not. In this sense, Y is not autonomous since it has no control 
over its own actions. On the other hand, agent has control over its behaviors or actions.  The 
interaction among the agents is more in the request and response manner. An agent may 
request an action to be done by another agent. But the decision on whether the action is 
performed lies solely with the recipient agent. 
Besides that, intelligent agents in online auctions never overbid. According to Lee and 
Malmendier (2007), human bidders often overbid their private valuations on items desired. 
Thus, by using intelligent agents, human bidders can be rest assured that overbidding does 
not occur to them since agents never bid above the maximum values provided by them. 
Due to the agent’s properties and capabilities, agent technology is acceptable in electronic 
commerce, particularly in the online auction. By applying agent technology in online 
auction, the challenges stated in Section 1.1 may be greatly lightened. However, knowing 
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which auction to bid is not sufficient to guarantee that the agents can win the auction. It also 
needs to consider how much should a bidder submit and its efficiency when competing 
with other human bidders or other bidder agents. 
1.3 Bidding issues 
When agents are deployed in online auction marketplaces, their owners usually explicitly 
inform them the maximum price of an item. Nonetheless, winning an auction with a lower bid 
indicates that the agent not only complete its task of obtaining the item, but also increases the 
profit or utility of the winner and vice-versa. Hence, many researchers have been studying 
different bidding strategies in different auction protocols with the hope to maximize the 
winner’s satisfaction. Some of these strategies are reviewed and developed from the 
perspective of game theory (Yang & Lu, 2007), neuro-fuzzy approach (He et al., 2004, 2006; Lin 
et al., 2006), grey theory predictive models (Lim et al., 2007; 2008), heuristic models (Anthony & 
Jennings, 2003; Yuen et al., 2006) or as from bidders’ behaviors (Roth & Ockenfels, 2002). 
Due to different available bidding strategies and studies on auction environment, more 
experienced or advanced bidders may obtain useful information to strategize their bidding 
behaviors in order to increase their winning probabilities. It is even more complicated when 
agent technology is implemented into this environment. On the one hand, with the help of 
intelligent agents, bidders can ease their searching and monitoring or even bidding tasks to 
them and be regularly informed. On the other hand, due to the capability of computational 
advantages, bidder agents may have more freedom to select and participate in different 
auctions to purchase their desired goods. In other words, sellers are now facing greater 
competition from around the world to attract buyers while human bidders are oppressed 
and have to make decision very carefully to outbid their counterparts. 
From another perspective, when homogeneous intelligent agents and heterogeneous 
intelligent agents are implemented in the marketplace, sellers may react differently due to 
the market economy and their revenues generated. A seller may assume that as more bidder 
agents are found in their auctions, this would lower their auction closing prices. It is because 
agents never overbid and they make wider survey than human bidders before participating 
in any auctions on the Internet. Nonetheless, as agent technology is becoming a dominant 
trend in developing online auctions mechanism, it would be interesting to study the reaction 
of sellers when they are confronted with bidder agents of single type and multiple types. 
Hence, this chapter attempts to study the impacts resulted from utilizing intelligent agents 
in the online auction marketplace. More specifically, the competitions among standard 
bidders and intelligent agents with various bidding strategies are to be analyzed. Standard 
bidders are to be categorized into 3 types according to their respective risk attitudes while 
intelligent agents are to be equipped with a heuristic bidding strategy, the greedy bidding 
strategy and the sniping strategy. From these competitions, the performance of each type of 
bidders and agents are to be examined. Furthermore, sellers’ reaction on the implementation 
of bidder agents is briefly examined. A simulated marketplace will be used to conduct these 
experiments and for further analysis. 
The rest of the chapter is arranged as follow: Section 2 discusses the related works on online 
English auctions, bidding strategies and bidder agents developed by other researchers. In 
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the next section, the architecture of the simulated marketplace is described. In Section 4, 
performances of different bidders are analyzed. Lastly, this paper ends with conclusions and 
suggestions for future works. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Online english auctions 
In English auction, a price is successively raised through submitting new bids by bidders 
until there is only one bidder who is willing to buy the item being auctioned (McAfee & 
McMillan, 1987). In this type of auction, all bids submitted are made known to every 
participant immediately. Therefore, interested bidders can submit their bids to outbid the 
current highest bidder. Besides that, before an auction is started, the seller may set a hidden 
price which indicates the minimum price he is willing to sell the item. This hidden price is 
commonly known as the seller’s reserve price. By implementing this reserve price, the item 
will only be sold if the closing price of an auction is not less than that. More interestingly, 
sometimes, the English auction is also known as the second highest price auction since the 
winner only pays a price that is equivalent to the second highest bidder’s valuation. 
Many researchers have shown their interests in the field of auction, especially on the English 
auction protocol since it is the most commonly accepted and widely implemented protocol 
in selling a single object. Hu and Bolivar (2008) showed their interest in online auctions 
efficiency, particularly on eBay auctions. They investigated and analyzed multiple online 
auction properties including consumer surplus and their cross-relationships. In their data 
analysis, they implemented consumer surplus ratio (CSR) as a measurement to evaluate the 
winners’ profit over the final value. Also, they utilized the concept of median instead of 
average in this CSR in order to reduce the influence of sparse outliers. By comparing the 
consumer surplus ratio, they found that the surplus ratio is generally impacted by the 
nature of the market and the ability to find a replacement. Rareness itself makes the 
valuation process difficult and thus is leading to high surplus ratios. 
Besides that, overbidding is one of the interesting scenarios found in online auctions. 
Overbidding is a phenomenon in which the winner of an auction finds himself paying too 
much to purchase the item being auctioned after the auction closes. Lee and Malmendier 
(2007) studied this phenomenon and found that such overbidding affects both private-value 
and common-value settings. In the work conducted, they found that even experienced 
bidders fell into this bidder’s curse. At first they may remember the upper limit of the bids. 
However, this memory fades out as time goes by. Besides that, the cost of switching from 
auctions to auctions or to fixed price transaction, the structure of outbid messages and the 
extra winning utility were introduced to explain the bidder’s curse. From another 
perspective, they suggested that sellers may benefit from such scenario in terms of their 
revenue earned. 
David et al. (2005) conducted their research in optimal design of English auctions with 
discrete bid levels. In their research, they aimed to provide the revenue maximizing design 
for this type of English auction. They identified that there is a case which two or more 
bidders are found in the same bid level and none of them can further increase the current 
price to another higher level. Thus, one of them is randomly selected as the current highest 
bidder and eventually the winner of the auction. Seller’s revenue in this case was 
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underestimated since the second highest bid may not be the second highest bidder’s 
valuation and the outcome may not be efficient as the item is not necessarily purchased by 
the bidder with the highest valuation. In order to maximize the revenue obtained in this 
case, they proposed and examined by empirical experiments that as the number of bidders 
increases, the bid levels become increasingly closer spaced. In their experiments, they also 
found that the optimal reserve price increases as more bidders participate in the auction. 
2.2 Bidder’s common behaviors 
There are commonly three distinct types of risk behaviors considered, namely risk aversion 
(RA), risk neutral (RN) and risk seeking (RS). Generally, a RA bidder is willing to 
compromise his profit to reduce the risk or uncertainty (the loss in an auction). With the 
same perspective, a RS bidder is willing to take the risk without giving up his profit. Lastly, 
a bidder is considered as RN if he is not affected by either the risks that come from the 
uncertainty he faces or the maximized profit (Watson, 2004). Of course, in different 
situations, the risk considered is varied according to the focus of the study. Also, the degree 
of risk-aversion or risk seeking are greatly dependent on how much from a bidder’s profit 
he is willing to sacrifice or how risky it is if he loses in an auction respectively. There are 
many researchers studying the impact contributed by these risks in different auctions such 
as McAfee and McMillan (1987), Klemperer (1999), Wolfstetter (1999) and Talluri and  
Ryzin (2004). 
On the other hand, Ockenfels and Roth mentioned in their respective papers (Ockenfels & 
Roth, 2002, 2006; Roth & Ockenfels, 2002) that many bidders (or their agents) tend to submit 
their bids late (this is also referred to as bid sniping). Hu and Bolivar (2008) also supported 
this finding by using eBay data collected. According to them, sniping is defined as the 
process of watching a timed online auction, placing a winning bid at the very last possible 
moment before an auction is ended. Sniping has an advantage of giving no time to other 
bidders to respond when they are outbid. Furthermore, they found that by performing 
sniping strategy, bidding wars are avoided among bidders and thus it will increase the 
expected bidder profits while decreasing the seller revenues. Therefore, the last-minute 
bidding is not simply due to naïve time-dependent bidding, but it responds to the strategic 
structure of the auction format in a predictable way. 
As the online auction is widely implemented and practiced in the trading community, there 
are hundreds of thousands of different auctions running simultaneously. Thus, soon bidders 
will find that choosing an auction is not an easy task. It is even more troublesome if several 
desired auctions come from different auction houses. Consequently, searching and 
monitoring those auctions become time consuming tasks. Fortunately, due to the 
proliferation of agent technology, these problems may be solved or greatly reduced by 
implementing this technology into the online auctions. 
2.3 Intelligent agents in online english auctions 
As mentioned by Dignum (2001), agents will only be used as user representatives if the 
benefits of using an agent are high and the trust that an agent will realize them is high. Due 
to the furtherance of the artificial intelligence and computer technology, using such 
technology in online auctions is at minimal cost. 
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First of all, Anthony and Jennings (2003) developed a bidding agent equipped with a 
heuristic bidding strategy for multiple heterogeneous auctions. This bidding strategy 
consists of four tactics, namely the remaining time tactic, the remaining auctions tactic, the 
desire for bargain tactic and the desperateness tactic. By combining these tactics and taking 
into account the priority of these tactics, a suggested bid is generated to its bidder and is to 
be used in the auction desired.  
Besides that, Yuen et al. (2006) investigated utility maximizing bidding heuristics for agents 
that participate in multiple heterogeneous auctions in which auction format and their start 
and end times might be varied. In their proposed bidding strategy, all four heuristic 
strategies outperformed the two benchmark strategies (greedy strategy and random 
strategy) used in their experiment. 
In other studies conducted by Lim et al. (2007, 2008), they argued that an intelligent agent 
would greatly help its bidder if the closing price of an auction is predicted successfully. 
Therefore, they studied several prediction models (ARIMA model, artificial neural network 
with backpropagation model and the grey theory prediction model) and found out that the 
grey prediction model successfully forecasted the most accurate data among these three 
prediction models. Furthermore, the concept of moving data was implemented to increase 
the accuracy of the predicted price. 
He et al. (2004, 2006) focused their interest on agent’s bidding strategy that is incorporated 
with neuro-fuzzy techniques, the Earliest Closest First heuristic algorithm. It identifies 
auctions that are most suited to the bidders’ requirements and according to their risk 
attitudes, bids in some other auctions that have approximately similar expected return, but 
which close earlier than those in the best return set. The greedy strategy, the fixed auction 
strategy and the average strategy were used to make comparison with their proposed 
strategy. From the results obtained, the Earliest Closest First algorithm performed better 
among these strategies considered. 
Park et al. (1999) developed an adaptive bidding strategy that would be used  by sellers in 
continuous double auction and it is implemented based on stochastic modeling. They 
argued that this strategy is capable of taking the dynamics and uncertainties of the auctions 
into account and therefore agents equipped with this strategy receive higher profit in the 
auctions participated. However, due to the computational cost and time consumption in this 
strategy, they further modified the strategy such that an agent equipped with this strategy 
might decide the time of using it. 
Ford et al. (2010) concentrated their research on layered bidding strategies for autonomous 
bidding agents. In their proposed strategies, a complex strategy (top layer) is formed from 
complex strategies or simple strategies (middle layer); while a simple strategy consists of 
atomic bidding actions (bottom layer). Users can easily specify a user defined strategy by 
manipulating the layers. Besides that, they proposed 2 algorithms that would convert those 
strategies into rule-based bidding strategies which will be executed by the bidding agents 
and for agents’ reasoning purposes. 
From the researches and studies discussed and reviewed in this section, it can be seen that 
studying online auction is not a new topic. By equipping different bidding strategies, 
computer agents are integrated to make decision in auctions marketplace on their users’ 
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behalf. However, there are still other areas in online auctions where researchers may 
explore. One of them is the market economy when a market is fully populated by 
homogeneous agents and heterogeneous agents. Besides that, as the implementation of 
agent technology becomes more acceptable in the online auction marketplace, sellers’ 
reactions when confronting with them may be an interesting subject to be studied. 
3. Simulated online auction marketplace 
There are many successful online auction houses that are running on the Internet such as 
eBay. However, due to different perspectives of houses administrators and researchers, data 
retrieval from these auction houses is restrictive if not impossible. Furthermore, certain 
information may not be extracted easily due to the legal responsibilities and sometimes data 
extraction is subject to disclosure of companies’ privacy. Therefore, simulated online auction 
marketplace becomes an alternative testing platform for researchers to conduct their 
experiments and retrieve data for further analyses. 
In this work, a simulated online auction marketplace is used to simulate a real auction house 
where multiple English auctions are conducted. Since they may have different start and end 
times, they are run concurrently in the auction house. Besides that, all auctions in this 
marketplace are the symmetric independent private values (SIPV) auctions (Matthews, 1995; 
Wolfstetter, 1999).  
In the setting phase, researchers can set a number of auctions to be conducted in this 
simulation in a range of 1 to 100 inclusive. While the number of auctions is determined by 
researchers, each auction’s start and end times are randomly assigned by the system. By doing 
so, these simulated concurrent English auctions are similar to the one found in the real online 
auction houses. Secondly, there are two types of bidders, a group of standard bidders and a 
group of bidders who use agent technology. Researchers can manually assign the number of 
standard bidders found in the marketplace in a range of 0 to 3000 inclusive and their risk 
behaviors. Next, the number of intelligent agents can be assigned in a range of 0 to 3000 
inclusive with three different bidding strategies, namely the greedy strategy (Byde, 2002), the 
sniping strategy (Ockenfels & Roth, 2002, 2006; Roth & Ockenfels, 2002; Hu & Bolivar, 2008) 
and a heuristic bidding strategy (Anthony & Jennings, 2003). The greedy strategy is selected 
because of its bidding attribute. Some bidders may use their agents to look for auctions with 
the lowest current bids. By doing so, they wish to purchase the items with minimal prices. 
Next, agents that are equipped with the heuristic bidding strategy selected here would 
represent another group of bidders who are well prepared before participating in any auction. 
They do not only consider the current bid, but also the number of similar auctions available, 
the timeline of obtaining the items if won and how desperate they are in procuring the items. 
Lastly, the sniping strategy is taken into account because it avoids bidding war (Ockenfels & 
Roth, 2002, 2006; Roth & Ockenfels, 2002). Moreover, another group of bidders who are 
impatient with longer auction closing time and keen to obtain the items desired without 
wasting time on surveying other auctions may prefer this strategy.  
Next, the system prepares the marketplace by generating auctions, sellers, both standard 
bidders and intelligent agents according to the predefined settings. Each auction is assigned 
a reserve price of the item randomly based on a normal distribution. This normal 
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distribution is generated by providing a mean value and a standard deviation value of the 
actual closing prices collected from Internet auctions. By doing so, the marketplace 
simulates the real online auctions pricing scenario. Besides that, the standard bidders and 
the intelligent agents are assigned their private valuations from the same normal 
distribution used for the item’s reserve price generation. These values are taken as the 
maximum values that they are willing to pay in obtaining the goods. After that, standard 
bidders are assigned to different auctions by the system. Whenever it is possible, standard 
bidders are distributed evenly to all the auctions generated. They are treated as the faithful 
bidders as they do not move from an auction to another. On the other hand, intelligent 
agents situate in the marketplace. Every time there is a bidding process conducted, these 
intelligent agents would find the most promising auction to participate. 
Lastly, auctions are started automatically if their start time is reached. Both standard bidders 
and intelligent agents are free to submit their bids according to their criteria and 
preferences. In this marketplace, a universal time is used and every time step is discrete and 
indivisible. In each time step, all auctions are checked if they are active. For each active 
auction, a standard bidder will be chosen randomly to submit a bid. At the same time, if 
there is any intelligent agent interested in submitting its bid in the same auction, a 
competition among the selected standard bidder and the intelligent agent(s) occurs. As a 
result, a higher bid would outbid lower bids. Besides that, if an auction’s end time is 
reached, the seller would announce the bidder with the highest bid as the winner of that 
auction if the auctions are closed with trading. Throughout the whole bidding process of 
different auctions conducted, their bidding histories are recorded for data analyses. 
3.1 Participants in the simulated online auction marketplace 
In this simulated platform, sellers are the owners of the item to be auctioned and are also the 
auctioneers who conduct the auctions.  They wish to sell their products through English 
auction protocol. Besides that, there are bidders in these auctions with the aim to obtain the 
desired goods. They are categorized further into two groups according to the usage of agent 
technology, the standard bidders and the bidders who utilize intelligent agents. 
3.1.1 Standard bidders and bidding behaviors 
Standard bidders do not implement any agents to act on their behalf. They would 
personally join an auction and submit a bid whenever it is possible. Furthermore, these 
standard bidders can also be categorized as faithful bidders since they will stay in an 
auction until they win that auction or when their private valuation is exceeded. Moreover, 
as long as the current bid in an auction is lower than their private valuations, they would 
submit their bids in the auction. However, bid increments vary depending on the bidders’ 
risk behaviors. 
There are 3 types of risk attitudes considered in this simulated marketplace, namely the risk 
aversion (RA), risk neutral (RN) and risk seeking (RS). In this marketplace, bidders face the 
risk of not winning an auction at the lowest closing price. By understanding the risk 
mentioned here, a RA bidder is afraid that he may pay an unnecessary higher price 
conditional on winning the auction. On the other hand, a RN bidder has no difference 
between paying more or less conditional on winning an auction. Lastly, a RS bidder is not 
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afraid of paying an unnecessary higher price conditional on winning an auction. A RA 
bidder would start bidding at a minimal bid increment (randomly chosen from a range of 1 
to 3 inclusive). By doing so, he hopes to submit a bid that is as minimal as possible which in 
turn would win the auction. However, their bidding strategy changes towards the end of an 
auction. If they are not the current highest bidder, they would bid more aggressively 
(randomly chosen from a range of 7 to 9 inclusive) to increase the probability of becoming 
the current highest bidder and eventually win the auction.   
On the other hand, a RS bidder would bid aggressively from the beginning of an auction 
(drawn randomly from a range of 7 to 9 inclusive). They are less concerned on paying too 
much as long as he obtains the item desired within his valuation. Moreover, they try to 
frighten other bidders by bidding aggressively. Nonetheless, as the time goes by, a RS 
bidder who is not the current highest bidder would try his best to become the leading 
bidder in the auction. But his private valuation is approaching due to his aggressive bidding 
from the beginning of an auction. Therefore, by realizing this fact, he changes his bidding 
strategy from an aggressive act to a more conservative way. He reduces his bid increment 
choices (in a range of 1 to 3 inclusive) to avoid bidding over his private valuation. 
At the same time, a RN bidder starts his bidding with a different strategy. Since he is 
indifferent with the risk of paying unnecessary higher price with the hope of winning an 
auction, he would bid constantly in his bid increment. In other words, he would not change 
his bid increment in his bidding process. His bid increment is almost a constant value from 
the beginning of an auction until the auction is closed (randomly drawn from a range of  
4 to 6 inclusive). 
Regardless of the risk attitudes, the bid increments used in this simulated auction house are 
arbitrary values. They are distributed uniformly and thus have equal chances to be selected. 
Any other value can be used to simulate their bidding behaviors. Besides that, these 
scenarios may be further explained by using the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility as 
explained by Bierman (1998).  
When explaining a bidder’s strategy with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility, the marginal 
utility and the motivation of submitting high or low bid are correlated. According to Fig. 1, 
when a RA bidder submits the first bid, if he wins at this point, he gains the maximum profit 
as indicated by the end point at the right most. Nevertheless, normally an auction receives 
more bids from other bidders. Therefore, he would continue to submit more bids until he is 
the leading bidder in the auction. So, the obtained profit is shifted to the left as more bids 
are submitted. As the profit decreases from right to left of the graph, the marginal utilities of 
different bids are compared. As indicated in the figure, the marginal utility from the first bid 
to second bid submitted is relatively smaller than the marginal utility from the latter bids. 
This marginal utility becomes larger when more bids are submitted. Therefore, a RA bidder 
would be motivated to submit a larger bid towards the end of an auction. 
Next, when a RN bidder submits his first bid and if he wins, he obtains his maximum profit 
from the auction as indicated by the end point at the right most of the Fig. 2. However, as 
more bidders participate in the same auction, he starts to counter bid his competitors by 
submitting subsequent bids. Hence, the profit gained from winning the auction is shifted to 
the left of the graph as more bids submitted. Nevertheless, the marginal utilities of his bids 
are constantly observed. It can be explained as the motivation of submitting subsequent bids 
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by a RN bidder is always the same. Consequently, a RN bidder would never change his bids 
either from the beginning of an auction or towards the end of the auction. 
Lastly, in Fig. 3, the end point located at the right most of the graph indicates the maximum 
profit obtained by a RS bidder if he wins an auction with his first bid. Nonetheless, more 
bids are usually required before winning an auction. Thus, the profit is shifted to the left of 
the graph. When comparing the marginal utility of each bid submitted, those earlier bids 
have larger marginal utilities than those bids submitted later. Thus, a RS bidder tends to 
submit larger bid increments at the beginning of an auction rather than towards the  
end of the auction. 
 
Fig. 1. Risk-averse Bidder’s von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility. 
 
Fig. 2. Risk Neutral Bidder’s von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility. 
 
Fig. 3. Risk Seeking Bidder’s von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility. 
3.1.2 Intelligent agents and bidding behaviors 
Another type of bidders utilizes intelligent agent technology to represent them in bidding 
process. Therefore, this type of bidders saves time on searching, monitoring and 
participating in an auction. These intelligent agents in this simulated marketplace are 
equipped with different bidding strategies according to the experimental setup. Firstly, by 
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using greedy strategy, an agent would always look for an auction with the lowest current 
bid as its target auction. Then it would increase the current bid with an increment from a 
range of 1 to 10 randomly. These values in the range are just arbitrary values. In the case 
where multiple auctions are found to have the lowest current price, the first auction found is 
to be selected as the target auction for an agent (Fig. 4). 
 
while ( t  < maxt  ) and (item not obtained = true) 
Build active auctions list 
List all auctions that are active before maxt . 
Select target auction as one that has the lowest current bid. 
Calculate the new bid, current bid + randomize bid increment. 
Bid in the target auction with the new bid. 
End while 
where t  is the current universal time across all auctions, maxt  is the agent’s allocated 
bidding time by when it must obtain the goods or leave the auctions. 
Fig. 4. The Top-level Algorithm for the Greedy Agent. 
Secondly, those agents equipped with the sniping strategy would hold their bids until the 
last time step of an auction with the hope of outbidding others while give them insufficient 
time to react. Their sniped bids are a sum of the current bid of an auction with an increment 
from a range of 1 to 10 (Fig. 5). Again, these values are just arbitrary values. Similarly, when 
there is more than an auction closes on the last possible time step, the first auction found by 
an agent would be selected as its target auction. 
 
while ( t  < maxt  ) and (item not obtained = true) 
Build active auctions list 
List all auctions that are active before maxt . 
Select target auction as one that has t = end time - 1. 
Calculate the new bid, current bid + randomize bid increment. 
Bid in the target auction with the new bid. 
End while 
where t  is the current universal time across all auctions, maxt  is the agent’s allocated 
bidding time by when it must obtain the goods or leave the auctions. 
Fig. 5. The Top-level Algorithm for the Sniping Agent. 
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Lastly, the Heuristic strategy consists of four tactics used in the bidding process, namely the 
remaining time tactic, the remaining auction tactic, the desire for bargaining and the 
desperateness of obtaining the item. In the first tactic, as every agent has its own time 
constraint, this tactic tackles with this limitation. Meanwhile, the second tactic handles the 
consideration of remaining auctions that are still available before an agent’s time is reached. 
Thirdly, if an agent is willing to bargain the price of an item desired, it would bid minimally 
to avoid paying a high price to win an auction. Finally, if an agent is desperate in obtaining 
an item from an auction, it would submit higher bids to increase its probability of winning 
that auction. After receiving the new suggested bid from the strategy, this new suggested 
bid is further modified if necessary (Fig. 6). 
Next, in order to decide which potential auctions to be participated, these Heuristic agents 
calculate the expected utility of each auction by using the equations below: 
  expected utility = ( ) ( )i iP v U v  (1) 
and 




  (2) 
where ( )iP v is the probability of winning an auction i at a bid v , ( )iU v is the utility of an 
auction i at a bid v, pr is the agent’s private valuation. After calculating the expected 
utilities of all auctions available, an auction with the highest expected utility is selected as 
the most promising auction. The agent would participate in the most promising auction 
with the bid received from its bidding strategy. 
 
while ( t  < maxt  ) and (item not obtained = true) 
Build active auctions list 
List all auctions that are active before maxt . 
Calculate the new suggested bid using the agent’s strategy. 
If the difference(suggested bid, current bid) > a preset threshold,  
new suggested bid = current bid + a portion of difference 
Select potential auctions from active auctions list to bid in. 
Select target auction as one that maximizes agent’s expected utility. 
Bid in the target auction with the new suggested bid.  
End while 
where t  is the current universal time across all auctions, maxt  is the agent’s allocated 
bidding time by when it must obtain the goods or leave the auctions. 
Fig. 6. The Top-level Algorithm for the Heuristic Bidding Agent. 
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In the next section, different experiments are performed according to the different auction 
requirements. Under different settings, from auction to a more general view of the 
marketplace are to be analyzed especially from the economic perspective. 
4. Experimental setup and results 
In this section, several empirical experiments are designed and conducted. Firstly, 
heterogeneous standard bidders will compete with homogeneous intelligent agents in an 
auction market. Secondly, competition occurs among heterogeneous standard bidders and 
heterogeneous intelligent agents. Thirdly, markets that are populated by homogeneous 
intelligent agents and heterogeneous intelligent agents are studied and analyzed.  
4.1 Methods of measurements 
In these empirical experiments conducted, several methods are utilized to evaluate the 
performance of different bidders and agents. They are the average winner’s utility, the 
average number of winning auctions, the average closing price and the consumer surplus 
ratio. These methods are measured according to the types of different participants. 
4.1.1 Average winner’s utility 
In every auction traded successfully, winner obtains certain profit from winning the auction. 
Besides that, since different bidders and agents may have different private valuations 
generated from the same normal distribution, this profit is evaluated as a ratio with respect 
to their own private valuations. By doing so, the factor of their different private valuations 
which would lead to various gains is greatly eliminated. To calculate the average winner’s 
utility, the following mathematical equations are used: 
௜ܷ௝ሺݒሻ ൌ ܲݎ௜ െ ݒ௝ܲݎ௜ ൅ ܿ (3)
and 
ഥܷ௜ሺݒሻ ൌ ∑ ௜ܷ௝ሺݒሻ௡೔௝ୀଵ݊௜  (4)
where ௜ܷ௝ሺݒሻ is the winner’s utility of auction ݆ gained by winners of type ݅, ܲݎ௜ is the private 
valuation of the winner of type ݅, ݒ௝ is the winning bid of auction ݆, ܿ is an arbitrary constant 
set to 0.001, ഥܷ௜ሺݒሻ is the average winner’s utility of type ݅, ݊௜ is the number of auctions won 
by winners of type ݅. In Equation 3, a constant ܿ is used to ensure that in the worst case 
where a winner pays his maximum valuation to purchase the item being auctioned, he still 
deserves a small gain compared to those who lose in the same auction. 
4.1.2 Average number of winning auctions 
In this method, auctions won by different groups of bidders and agents are counted into 
their respective categories. This method is concerned with the number of winning auctions 
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in a society of a certain type of winners. To calculate the average number of winning 
auctions for a given bidder or agent in the marketplace, the following equation is used: 
ܹ௜ ൌ ∑ number of auctions	won by winners of type ݅௡ଵ ݊  (5)
where ܹ௜ is the average number of auctions won by winners of type ݅, ݊ is the number of 
runs conducted in the experiment. 
4.1.3 Average closing price 
The third measurement is the average closing price. Based on this measurement, the 
performance of the winners is evaluated in terms of the price paid to purchase the item 
desired.  
̅ܥ௜ ൌ ∑ ܥ௜௝௡೔௝ୀଵ݊௜  (6)
where, ܥ௜௝ is the winning bid of auction ݆ submitted by winners of type ݅, ݊௜ is the number of 
auctions won by winners of type ݅. 
4.1.4 Average consumer surplus ratio 
The consumer surplus ratio (CSR) is introduced by Hu and Bolivar (2008) which considers 
the number of bids found in an auction and the median number of bids across all the 
auctions conducted. This ratio is used to show the surplus gained by each winner with 
respect to his private valuation. Hence, it is similar to the average winner’s utility. However, 
it considers also the number of bids received in each auction and the median number of bids 
received across all the auctions available. It is assumed that an auction with more bids 
submitted will most probably ends with higher price compared to auctions with less bids. In 
this research, intelligent agents are free to select the auction to participate based on their 
selection model. So, in a market where multiple agents of different types are found, the 
considerations in this ratio would reduce the extreme bids submitted and the influence of 
number of bids. This ratio is evaluated as follow: 
ܥܵ ௝ܴ ൌ Median ∀௝ ቆ൫ ுܸ೔ െ ிܸ೔൯ ∙ ሺ ௜ܰ ൅ ܰ௠ሻிܸ೔ ∙ ௜ܰ ൅ ுܸ೔ ∙ ܰ௠ ቇ (7)
and 
CSRതതതതത୨ ൌ ∑ CSR୨୬ଵ n  (8)
where ݆ is the type of winners, ுܸ೔is the winner’s private valuation in auction ݅, ிܸ೔  is the 
final winning bid in auction ݅, ௜ܰ is the number of bids of item ݅, ܰ௠ is the median number of 
bids across all the auctions conducted, ܥܴܵതതതതതത௝ is the average CSR of winners of type ݆, ݊ is the 
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number of runs conducted in the experiment. A high value in this CSR would indicate that 
the winner receives high surplus compared to his own private valuation after minimizing 
the influences as stated in the considerations. 
4.1.5 Average seller’s utility 
On the other hand, as suggested by Krishna (2002), sellers extract more revenues from 
auctions with higher number of bidders. In this market, some auctions may receive more 
bids compared to other auctions. Therefore, by using the ratio instead of the surplus, the 
factor of having different values of winning bids in different auctions is minimized. The 
equation is given as below: 
௝ܴሺݒሻ ൌ ݒ௝ െ ܴ ௝ܲݒ௝  (9)
and 
തܴሺݒሻ ൌ ∑ ௝ܴሺݒሻ௡௝ୀଵ݊  (10)
where ௝ܴሺݒሻ is the seller’s utility of auction ݆, ݒ௝ is the winning bid of auction ݆, ܴ ௝ܲ is the 
seller’s reserved price of auction ݆, തܴሺݒሻ is the average seller’s utility, ݊ is the number of 
auctions that are closed with winner. 
4.2 Normal distribution of data 
Before any experiment is conducted, data generated from this marketplace are checked on 
its consistency and its normality by using statistical software SPSS Statistic. The simulated 
marketplace is run 10, 30 and 50 times. By doing so, when the market is repeated with a 
relatively fewer runs, data consistency is checked. With these different numbers of runs, 
data collected are compared by using ANOVA test to check whether the closing prices are 
significantly different among these groups. In every run, 30 auctions, 180 standard bidders 
and 120 intelligent agents are generated by the system. More specifically, within the time ݐ଴ 
to ݐ௠௔௫, each auction will start and end according to their randomly assigned time 
constraints. Meanwhile, participants join different auctions based on their attributes. In this 
marketplace with the ratio used, standard bidders are distributed evenly across 30 auctions. 
Counter bidding process happens between standard bidders and intelligent agents until ݐ௠௔௫ is reached, then the market is said to have conducted a complete run.  
Before performing the ANOVA test, two assumptions have to be verified, namely the 
normality of the data distribution and the homogeneity of variances. In the first verification, 
the hypotheses are given below: ܪ଴: The	population	means	are	equal	among	the	groups	of	samples.  ܪଵ: The	population	means	are	not	equal	among	the	groups	of	samples.  
To check the distribution of the data collected, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic with a 
Lilliefors significance level is used. From the results shown in Fig. 7, the significance levels 
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of Kolmogorov-Smirnov (Sig.) in different runs are 0.200, 0.200 and 0.199 respectively, 
which are greater than 0.05. Therefore, null hypothesis is accepted. That is, the normality of 
data collected (closing prices) is assumed. In other words, data collected from the 
marketplace can be used to represent the actual scenario found in the real online auction 
houses since these data collected is distributed normally according to the SPSS analysis. 
Next, the second assumption is checked. The Levene’s test of homogeneity of variances is 
used for this purpose. However, from the result shown in Fig. 8, the second assumption 
cannot be verified (݌ < 0.05). Fortunately, SPSS does provide alternative approaches to 
verify the homogeneity of variances; they are the Brown-Forsythe and Welch procedures 
which can still be used to support the ANOVA test. From Fig. 9, the significance levels of 
Brown-Forsythe and Welch procedures are 0.537 and 0.670 respectively (݌ > 0.05). Hence, 
the homogeneity of variances is assumed. 
 
Fig. 7. Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk statistic. 
By using ANOVA test, a null hypothesis of “there is no significant difference among closing 
prices across different sets of samples” would be accepted if the significance level (Sig.) is 
greater than 0.05. From the results shown in Fig. 10, the null hypothesis is accepted since 
F(2, 87) = 0.404, ݌ = 0.669 (Sig. value in ANOVA test) which is greater than 0.05. However, 
due to the violation of Levene’s test of homogeneity of variances, therefore, the Brown-
Forsythe F-ratio and Welch procedure are reported here. There is no significant difference 
among these closing prices across different sets of samples, since F (2, 56.722) = 0.404, ݌ > 
0.05 (Brown-Forsythe F-ratio) and F (2, 53.278) = 0.629, ݌ > 0.05 (Welch procedure). In 
summary, from analyzing results of this ANOVA test, there is no significant difference 
found in the closing prices collected from various numbers of runs. Thus, in the following 
experiments, the simulations are run 10 times for different research purposes. 
 
Fig. 8. Levene’s test of homogeneity of variances. 
 
Fig. 9. Brown-Forsythe and Welch procedures in ANOVA test. 
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Fig. 10. ANOVA test. 
4.3 Competition among heterogeneous standard bidders and homogeneous 
intelligent agents 
In this experiment, 3 types of standard bidders are competing with the Heuristic agents 
simultaneously. Two simulations are conducted in this experiment. The first simulation is 
conducted to create the competition among standard bidders with assigned risk types and 
Heuristic agents. In the second simulation, the competition occurs among standard bidders 
with randomized risk types and Heuristic agents.  
4.3.1 Experimental setup 
In the first simulation, the numbers of standard bidders according to their different risk 
types are assigned. However, in the second simulation, the numbers of standard bidders 
with different risk attitudes are randomized by the system. The total number of buyers in 
the marketplace is always 300 and the proportion of standard bidders and intelligent agents 
is maintained in different runs. In a real auction marketplace, intelligent agents may observe 
their environment and obtain useful information such as the number of bidders. By running 
these two simulations, the agents’ performance is tested when the numbers of standard 
bidders with different risk behaviors are known or when it is assumed wrongly. More 
specifically, there are 10 situations in every simulation and each situation is repeated 10 
times. Every time a new situation is conducted, 10% of the standard bidders are replaced by 
the Heuristic agents until the last run, where 90% of the buyers are Heuristic agents. 
Intelligent agents of type Heuristic are selected to represent the intelligent agents because of 
their outstanding performance among the three types considered in this work (their 
performances are analyzed in Section 4.5.2). Nonetheless, there are always 30 auctions and 
300 buyers found in the marketplace. Every auction generated has an active period of 100 
time steps. Within this period of time, both standard bidders and Heuristic agents are 
competing to become the leading bidder in an auction. 
4.3.2 Experimental results 
a. Competition among Heterogeneous Standard Bidders with Assigned Risk Types and 
Heuristic Agents 
In Fig. 11, it is observed that in all the situations where agents are found, their winner’s 
utility is found higher than the other bidders’ types. When agents were competing with 
multiple types of standard bidders in auction marketplace, they outperformed their 
counterparts by receiving higher intrinsic rewards. Besides that, generally, the rewards 
received by these Heuristic agents are increasing as more agents are found in the market. 
ANOVA
Average Closing Price







Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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Next, Heuristic agents successfully obtain the goods desired with lower prices compared to 
other bidders in the same market (Fig. 12). In addition, it is noticeable that the closing prices 
obtained by all winners’ types seem to be converging towards Situation 9. It may be caused 
by the growing of the agent’s population since Heuristic agents are capable on deciding the 
auction to be participated and the reasonable bids to be submitted. By doing so, they reduce 
bidding war with other participants but themselves in the market and as a result, the closing 
price of each auction is approximately distributed in a narrower range. 
In Fig. 13, as the number of the standard bidder decreases, their number of winning auctions 
is also reduced. The two lines plotted in the same figure indicate the sums of auctions won 
by standard bidders and Heuristic agents. In this case, the number of auctions won by these 
agents is not as many as achieved by the standard bidders since these agents are equipped 
with the same strategy and are free to select their most promising auctions within the 
market, they may concentrate on several auctions while neglecting the less promising 
auctions. As a consequence, fewer auctions are won by the Heuristic agents. 
 
Fig. 11. Average winner’s utility according to different winners’ types. 
 
Fig. 12. Average closing prices obtained by different winner’s types. 
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b. Competition among Heterogeneous Standard Bidders with Randomized Risk Types 
and Heuristic Agents 
In Fig. 14, the winner’s utility of the agents is fluctuated across the situations due to the 
irregularity of the numbers of standard bidders according to their risk behaviors that are 
found in the marketplace. When these numbers are unknown, Heuristic agents face the 
difficulty in tuning their bidding strategy appropriately. However, when comparison is 
made across the situations, the agents still received higher utilities in most of the situations. 
Next, Fig. 15 shows the performance of different winners’ types in terms of closing price. 
The most obvious observation is that the Heuristic agents successfully obtained their desired 
items with the lowest closing prices in all the situations considered. Besides that, the closing 
prices of all situations seem to be converging towards Situation 9. This is due to the growth 
of the agent population and thus reduces the bidding war among bidders. Consequently, 
the differences among closing prices of different winners’ types are becoming smaller. 
Lastly, as the population of agents is growing, they obtained more auctions compared to 
their counterparts (in Fig. 16). Nonetheless, the number of this achievement is not as high as 
the number achieved by those standard bidders. It may be due to the capability of Heuristic 
agents that are not restricted to any auctions. Therefore, they may select their best auctions 
to participate. In certain circumstances, some of the auctions are left without much attention 
from these agents. As a result, the number of winning auctions obtained by Heuristic agents 
is fewer than the auctions won by standard bidders. 
 
 
Fig. 14. Average winner’s utility according to different winner’s types. 
 
 


























































Fig. 16. Number of auctions won by different winner’s types. 
4.3.3 Summary of the experiment 
Heuristic agents outperformed their competitors in obtaining goods desired while trying to 
keep the closing prices cheaper regardless of the correct assumption on the number of 
standard bidders based on their risk types. Therefore, from the bidders’ point of view, it can 
be concluded that in general, by implementing agent technology, it improves their 
satisfaction in terms of the intrinsic saving values received and the auction closing prices. 
On the other hand, sellers’ revenues are reduced in this experiment with finite auctions and 
participants since the auction closing prices are decreasing. 
4.4 Competition among heterogeneous standard bidders and heterogeneous 
intelligent agents 
In the next experiment, heterogeneous standard bidders and heterogeneous intelligent 
agents are generated in the same marketplace. In this experiment, performance of each 
winner’s group is examined. Furthermore, the market economy is also evaluated. 
4.4.1 Experimental setup 
In this experiment, a simulation that involves both 3 types of standard bidders and 3 types of 
intelligent agents is considered. Besides the standard bidders and Heuristic agents, the Greedy 
agents and the Sniping agents are introduced. A Greedy agent is an agent that always 
participates in an auction with the lowest current bid. A Sniping agent is an agent that always 
targets on the auction that closes in the next possible moment. In this experiment, the 
competition occurs not only between standard bidders and intelligent agents, it occurs also 
within the groups of standard bidders and intelligent agents with different types. Hence, the 
auctions generated are increased to 90 and the total bidders are set to 900. Besides that, the 
number of situations used in this experiment is reduced to 4 as shown in Table 1. In this 
experiment, the focus is shifted from the advantages of using agents to the general market 
economy. Thus, fewer situations are considered. As multiple intelligent agents and standard 
bidders are located in a market, it would further simulate the real online auction marketplace 
where bidders may have different bidding behaviors or implement different bidder agents. 
 
Situation  0  1  2  3 
Standard Bidders  900  810  540  270  
Intelligent Agents  0  90  360  630  
































Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Agents in Electronic Auctions 
 
65 
4.4.2 Experimental results 
From Fig. 17, in all the situations analyzed, Greedy and Heuristic agents obtained higher 
winner’s utility compared to other standard bidders. It may be credited to their bidding 
strategies which would lead them in suitable auctions and suggest an appropriate bid to be 
submitted. Sniping agents scored the lowest utility in all the situations because of its attitude 
of always search and snipe in the auctions that would close in the next time step. As a result, 
they may end up with paying higher prices when obtaining the items. 
Next, the average number of winning auctions obtained by different groups of winners is 
illustrated in Fig. 18. First of all, standard bidders procured fewer items as more agents are 
located in the market. Besides that, Sniping agents successfully outperformed the other two 
types of agents in Situation 2 where 40% of the market participants are intelligent agents. It may 
indicate that sniping strategy is suitable to be used to obtain the items desired when agents’ 
population is relatively smaller. Nonetheless, Heuristic agents performed outstandingly in 
Situation 3 with 20.6 auctions won on average. In all the situations analyzed, the overall closing 
numbers are 89.6, 89.4, 89.6 and 89.5 respectively. These numbers may not equal to 90 as some 
of the auctions are closed without winners (seller’s reserve price is not met). 
In Fig. 19, as more agents participate in an auction market, the closing price is decreasing. 
This can be seen from Situation 1 to Situation 3. There is an increase in closing price from 
Situation 0 to Situation 1. It may be explained as when more bidders’ types are found in the 
market, it affects the competition that occurs within the market. Besides that, when 
comparison is made among the intelligent agents, it can be seen that Sniping agents pay 
more in obtaining the items desired. Their winning bids are greatly affected by the winning 
bids of other standard bidders. They always snipe in auctions at the very last possible 
moments. Thus, they have to submit higher bids to overbid the current leading bidders and 
it causes their closing prices to be the highest among the agents community. 
 
Fig. 17. Average winner’s utility according to winner’s types. 
 


































































Fig. 19. Average closing price according to winner’s types. 
4.4.3 Summary of the experiment 
Generally, in this experiment, the auction closing prices are decreasing as intelligent agents 
are involved in the market. Moreover, these agents successfully help their bidders to obtain 
items desired while trying to achieve greater saving. The Sniping agents do not perform 
well in obtaining desired goods while achieving greater saving as the other 2 types of 
agents. However, to those bidders who need the item required desperately, the Sniping 
agents may become one of their options since they would obtain the goods desired within a 
short period of time and the price paid is always within their private valuations. From the 
seller’s perspective, they may prefer more standard bidders in their auctions than intelligent 
agents since more standard bidders increase their revenues gained from the auctions. 
4.5 Special cases in simulated marketplace 
In this experiment, two cases are considered and studied, a market that is fully populated by 
intelligent agents of single type is simulated and a market that is fully resided by multiple 
types of intelligent agents is analyzed. In both cases, besides the performances used in the 
previous experiments, the average CSR, is implemented. Due to the flexibility of agents, 
there may be an extreme case where several auctions are selected by all the agents while the 
rest of the auctions are left unattended or receive extremely few bids. Consequently, 
auctions with fewer bids may most probably close with low prices and vice-versa. 
Therefore, by using this CSR, it calculates the surplus ratio while minimizing the influence 
of the bids received by each auction and at the same time, it considers the median number of 
bids received across all the auctions generated. 
4.5.1 Experimental setup 
In the first simulation, a marketplace of 90 auctions is generated and the performances of 
900 Heuristic agents are evaluated (homogeneous environment). Heuristic agents are 
selected in this homogeneous environment because of its outstanding performances 
compared to other types of agents implemented in this work (see Section 4.5.2 for its 
results). In the real auctioning world, it may be hard to find a market that is only resided by 
agents of single type. However, if a known strategy can guarantee a win in the auction with 
profit; eventually everyone will use the same strategy. This will lead to an environment 
similar to our case. Next, in the second simulation, 900 intelligent agents with various 
bidding strategies participate in 90 auctions generated (heterogeneous environment). The 
performances of these intelligent agents are analyzed and lastly a comparison between their 
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4.5.2 Experimental results 
Table 2 shows the various performances of intelligent agents in homogeneous environment 
and heterogeneous environment. On average, the homogeneous bidder agents recorded an 
average winner utility of 0.1318. Meanwhile, in the heterogeneous environment, Heuristic 
agents, Greedy agents and Sniping agents recorded average winning utilities of 0.1072, 
0.0957 and 0.0391 respectively. A higher utility would mean a greater satisfaction for the 
winners since they receive higher intrinsic saving. The Sniping agents received the lowest 
utility because they ignored the auctions that are not closing soon but may return to them a 
better utility if they were winning in these auctions. When comparing the average utilities 
between Heuristic agents in Environment 1 and Environment 2, they received lower utility 
in heterogeneous environment as competition arises between groups of various agents. 
Next, out of 90 auctions generated, 22.6 and 87.8 auctions on average are closed with 
winners in Environment 1 and 2 respectively. In Environment 1, since all of these Heuristic 
agents are equipped with the same strategy and are free to join any auction, they may end 
up bidding in similar auctions while neglecting the less promising auctions. Conversely, 
when various types of agents are populated in the market, they may select different auctions 
to join based on their strategies and thus encourage more successful trades. From Table 2, 
Heuristic agents obtained 53.56% of the items being auctioned (in Environment 2) in the 
market. This can be credited to their auction selection strategy and their bidding strategy 
that considers the available auction information. It is worth noticing that Sniping agents 
obtained more items than Greedy agents due to their sniping capability of giving 
insufficient time to their counterparts to react. Besides that, simply looking at the lowest 
current bid may lead the agents to jump from an auction with higher probability of winning 
to other more risky auctions. 
 
Performances 
Environment 1 Environment 2 
A Market populated by 
Homogeneous Agents 
A Market populated by 
Heterogeneous Agents 
Heuristic Greedy Heuristic Sniping 
Average Winner’s Utility 0.1318 0.0957 0.1072 0.0391 
Average Winning Auction 22.6 16.5 48.2 23.1 
Average CSR 0.1315 0.0817 0.1013 0.0110 
Average Auction Closing Price 373.1478 344.6544 
Average Seller’s Utility 0.3088 0.2497 
Average Median Number of Bids 
Received in a Completed Auction 
26.8 14.7 
Table 2. Performances of Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Agents in a Market of 90 
English Auctions Generated. 
Furthermore, from Table 2 also, winners of type Heuristic received 0.1315 as their average 
CSR in homogeneous environment.  On the other hand, Greedy agents, Heuristic agents and 
Sniping agents obtained 0.0817, 0.1013 and 0.0110 respectively as their average CSR in the 
heterogeneous environment. The Sniping agents received the lowest utility because they 
ignored the auctions that are not closing soon but may return to them a better utility if they 
were winning in these auctions. When comparing the average CSR between Heuristic agents 
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in Environment 1 and 2, they received lower ratio in the latter environment as competition 
arises among groups of various agents (in Environment 2). 
From Table 2 also, on average, each auction that is closed with a winner has a closing price 
of 373.1478 (in Environment 1) and 344.6544 (in Environment 2). In addition, from the 
sellers’ perspective, they received 0.3088 and 0.2497 as their average utility in Environment 1 
and Environment 2 respectively. This utility indicates the gross margin of the sellers. Lastly, 
on average, there are 26.8 bids (Environment 1) and 14.7 bids (Environment 2) received in 
every completed auction. 
By comparing the results from both experiments, when homogeneous agents are competing 
with one another in a market, their average auction closing price is higher than the price in a 
market of heterogeneous agents. Those homogeneous agents with similar bidding strategy 
would most probably participate in few auctions and leave the rest of the auctions 
unattended. Therefore, the final closing price increases as the competition among buyers 
increases. It is supported by the average median number of bids submitted in a completed 
auction. This finding is also consistent with the suggestion in the work of Krishna (2002). 
Even though a market with single type of agents produced a higher returned sellers’ margin, 
in terms of the number of successful auctions, Environment 1 is worse than the Environment 2. 
Hence, if the average seller’s profit is calculated based on the average auction closing price, the 
average seller’s utility and the average number of traded auctions, the former market would 
generate 2604.1537 compared to the latter market that would produce 7556.0859. Based on the 
profit calculated, sellers may prefer heterogeneous bidder agents instead of homogeneous 
bidder agents as their auctions’ participants since they bring more profit to sellers. 
4.5.3 Summary of the experiment 
In summary, in a market that is fully populated by homogeneous bidder agents, even 
though they obtained the highest average winner’s utility and average CSR, they performed 
badly in terms of the number of winning auctions (25.11%). This finding is similar to the 
results obtained by Airiau and Sen (2003) and Byde (2002) which stated that multiple 
strategic buyers with the same strategy performed worse than their performance in situation 
where other types of bidders are present. Meanwhile, a market fully populated by 
heterogeneous bidder agents may achieve higher closing rate of 97.56% due to their various 
bidding strategies that led them to different auctions. Eventually, a healthier competitive 
environment was created. Moreover, sellers would prefer the participation of heterogeneous 
agents compared to homogeneous agents since it brings more sales and profit. 
5. Conclusion 
In this work, 3 distinct groups of standard bidders, namely the risk-averse, risk neutral and 
risk seeking bidders and 3 types of intelligent agents, namely the Greedy agents, the Heuristic 
agents and the Sniping agents are introduced to represent the potential buyers in the 
auctioning world according to their attributes. A market that is occupied by various standard 
bidders and intelligent agents would represent the real auction market where human bidders 
of different risk types and bidders who use intelligent agents as their representatives are 
competing with one another. From the empirical results, intelligent agents are capable in 
bringing more satisfaction to their owners if the correct agents are selected. 
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Besides that, markets that are fully dominated by homogeneous intelligent agents and fully 
dominated by heterogeneous intelligent agents are studied. It was clearly observed from the 
results obtained that a market that is occupied by intelligent agents of various types would 
benefit both sellers and buyers if the implementation of agent technology is unavoidable. Even 
though bidders may receive higher intrinsic saving value in homogeneous scenario, the 
chances of getting the desired items are greatly reduced. On the other hand, agent technology 
has been dominating the online auctioning world. Thus, sellers may welcome heterogeneous 
agents than homogeneous agents since the former encourages more trades than the latter. 
There are still many aspects where this work does not cover where further researches can be 
explored. One of these areas would be the prediction capability. All the intelligent bidding 
strategies used in this research do not take into account the past historical data of the items 
being auctioned and therefore are not able to predict the auction closing prices. It would be 
useful if these intelligent agents are equipped with prediction capability in participating 
auctions. With the predicted closing price, agents can make better decision based on their 
private valuation and these predicted prices. 
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